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TAX LAW 
ATTORNEY'S FEES FOR PREVAILING 
TAXPAYERS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Sliwa v. Commissioner/ the Ninth Circuit held that the 
IRS' unreasonable conduct, even before litigation in court actu-
ally starts, may be grounds permitting a taxpayer to recover at-
torney's fees. 2 Internal Revenue Code section 74303 provided 
1. 839 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1988) (per Poole, J.; the other panel members were Dim-
mick, J. and Boochever, J., concurring and dissenting.) 
2. Id. at 607. 
3. I.R.C. § 7430 (1983) (prior to 1986 amendments) provided in pertinent part: 
SECTION. 7430. AWARDING OF COSTS AND CERTAIN 
FEES. 
(a) In General.- In the case of any civil proceeding which 
is-
(1) brought by or against the United States in connection 
with the determination, collection, or refund of any tax, inter-
est, or penalty under this title, and 
(2) brought in a court of the United States (including the 
Tax Court and the United States Claims Court), the prevail-
ing party may be awarded a judgment for reasonable litigation 
costs incurred in such proceeding. 
(c) Definitions.-For purposes of this section-
(2)Prevailing Party.-
(A) In general-The term "prevailing party" means any 
party to any proceeding described in subsection (a) (other 
than the United States or any creditor of the taxpayer in-
volved) which-
(i) establishes that the position of the United States in 
the civil proceeding was unreasonable, and 
(ii)(I) has substantially prevailed with respect to the 
amount in controversy, or 
(II) has substantially prevailed with respect to the most 
significant issue or set of issues presented. 




Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1989
238 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:237 
that a taxpayer may recover reasonable litigation costs if the 
IRS· had taken an unreasonable position in a civil proceeding. /I 
As part of the Tax Reform Act of 19866 Congress revised section 
7430 to provide that the term "position of the United States" 
termination under subparagraph (A) as to whether a party is a 
prevailing party shall be made-
(i) by the court, or 
(ii) by agreement of the parties. 
(3) Civil actions.-The term "civil proceeding" includes a 
civil action. 
Section 7430 was subsequently amended by the TRA '86. See infra note 6 and ac-
companying text. 
Section 7430 as originally enacted and under the 1986 amendments applies only to 
attorney fees incurred after litigation has commenced, even though IRS conduct before 
litigation commenced has been considered by the Ninth Circuit and other courts in 
awarding post-complaint fees. 
Section 7430 has again been substantially amended by the Omnibus Taxpayer Bill 
of Rights which was enacted on November 11, 1988 as part of the Technical and Miscel-
laneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647 § 6239(a) 102 Stat. 3342, 3743-3746 
(1988) reprinted in (1988) 55 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. Extra Edition (CCH) par. 5439. The 
new law applies to proceedings commencing after November 10, 1988 and is outside the 
scope of this note. 
Because of the large backlog of cases before the Tax Court the impact of this new 
legislation will not be felt in many cases for several years. At the end of 1987 there were 
82,000 cases pending before the Tax Court. Nelson & Keightley, Managing the Tax 
Court Inventory, 7 VA. TAX L. REV. 451, 454 (1989). As of April 1987, 47.5% of pending 
Tax Court cases had been docketed for less that one year, 37.7% were within a one to 
three year range and 15.3% had been pending for more than three years. Id. at 453-54. 
Thus, § 7430 as codified prior to the enactment of the new 1988 amendments, and which 
gave rise to the issues litigated in Sliwa, will continue to govern many cases for the next 
few years. 
Under the new law § 7430 has been expanded to allow taxpayers to recover reasona-
ble administrative costs (including attorneys fees) incurred in certain administrative pro-
ceedings before the IRS as well as reasonable litigation costs. I.R.C. § 7430(a) (1988). In 
addition, the definition of the "position of the United States" has been revised. For re-
covery of litigation costs in court proceedings the position of the United States means 
the position taken by the Government in that proceeding. I.R.C. § 7430(c)(7)(A)(1988). 
For recovery of administrative costs the position of the United States means the position 
taken by the Government as of the earlier of (1) the date of the receipt by the taxpayer 
of the notice of decision of the IRS Appeals Office, or (2) the date of the notice of defi-
ciency. I.R.C. § 7430(c)(7)(B)(1988). 
4. The terms "IRS," (Internal Revenue Service) "Government," and "Commis-
sioner" are hereafter used interchangeably. 
5. The procedure for filing a motion for litigation costs under section 7430 in the 
Tax Court is described in Rule 231, U.S. TAX CT. R. PRAeT. & PROC. The motion must be 
filed within 30 days after the court issues its opinion in a case that has gone to trial. If 
the taxpayer "substantially prevails" in a settlement without trial, the section 7430 mo-
tion must be filed at the same time as the stipulated decision. Id.(1988) 9 Stand. Fed. 
Tax Rep. (CCH) 11 5825m. 
6. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2752 (1986) [hereinafter 
TRA '86). 
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includes both the position taken in the civil proceeding as well 
as "[a]ny administrative action or inaction by the District Coun-
seF of the Internal Revenue Service. . . upon which such a pro-
ceeding is based."8 
Although Sliwa was decided under the prior statute, the 
court took note of the revised statute. The Ninth Circuit viewed 
the language added by Congress as "shedding light on Congress' 
mandate that section 7430 provide attorney's fees to a prevailing 
party in cases where litigation is necessitated by the Govern-
ment's unreasonable conduct at the administrative leveP 
The court in Sliwa held for a broad reading of the statute in 
favor of the taxpayer and examined both the reasonableness of 
the position taken by the IRS during litigation as well as the 
reasonableness of its pre-litigation conduct.10 However, the 
Ninth Circuit found in this case that the Government had acted 
7. See (1988) 9 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) par. 5975.05. The District Counsel is 
the division of the IRS whose responsibilities include handling litigation of cases before 
the Tax Court. In most cases, it is only after the taxpayer files a petition in Tax Court 
that the IRS attorneys of the District Counsel review the case and take whatever actions 
necessary to defend the Government. 
8. 26 U.S.C. § 7430 (c)(4)(B)(1987). The TRA '86 at § 1551 modified some of the 
provisions of § 7430, effective for litigation costs incurred after 9/30/86 in civil actions or 
proceedings commenced after 1985. 
Under the original 1982 statute the taxpayer had to show that the Government's 
position had been "unreasonable". The 1986 amendments changed that standard to "not 
substantially justified". I.R.C. § 7430(c)(2)(i)(1987). Most courts have held that the two 
terms are synonymous. Sher v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 79, 84 (1987). In Sher, the tax-
payer was assessed with what the IRS alleged was unreported dividend income from 
investments. Id. at 80. The taxpayer mailed evidence to an IRS agent verifying the in-
come he had reported. Id. at 81. Nonetheless, the Commissioner issued a notice of defi-
ciency to the taxpayer and the taxpayer was compelled to file a petition with the Tax 
Court. Id. at 82. Shortly after answering the petition the Government conceded that the 
IRS had erroneously included income earned in a tax free benefit plan as part of the 
taxpayer's taxable income. Id. at 87. The court denied the taxpayer's motion for attor-
ney's fees holding that the pre-petition conduct of the IRS was irrelevant to whether the 
Government had acted unreasonably. Id. In addition, under TRA '86 a taxpayer whose 
net worth is in excess of $2 million does not qualify for attorney's fees. I.R.C. § 
7430(c)(2)(A)(iii)(1987). Finally, the $25,000 ceiling on awards under the prior statute 
was replaced by a $75 per-hour limitation. I.R.C. § 7430(c)(I)(A)(ii)(III)(1987). 
9. Sliwa, 839 F.2d 602 at 607 n.6. The court was implying that the amendment 
ought to be read broadly to include other administrative conduct of the IRS. See Devin, 
Tax Court Review of IRS' Position: When May Taxpayers Recover Legal Fees?, 68 J. 
TAX'N. 368, 370 n. 8 (1988) [hereafter Devin] ( A discussion of the issue of what consti-
tutes the "Government's position" and the "position of the District Counsel" under 
amended section 7430). 
10. Sliwa, 839 F.2d at 607. 
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reasonably and did not allow the taxpayer to recover her attor-
ney's fees. ll 
II. FACTS 
From 1975 until 1977 Sylvia Sliwa's former husband, Ken-
neth Sliwa, embezzled money from his employer, Marriot Corpo-
ration, to cover accrued gambling debts.12 During these years the 
Sliwas filed joint income tax returns.13 None of Kenneth's illegal 
income from the embezzlement was reported to the IRS.14 In 
1978 the Sliwas divorced and entered into a separation agree-
ment under which Kenneth conveyed his interest in the marital 
home to Sylvia. Iii 
The IRS learned of the unreported gambling income and in 
1981 issued a joint notice of deficiency16 in income tax for tax 
years 1975, 1976 and 1977.l7 Since the Sliwas had filed joint re-
turns during those years, Sylvia and Kenneth were jointly liable. 
The Commissioner mailed the notice to Kenneth at his new ad-
dress, but did not send a notice to Sylvia at the old Sliwa 
residence. IS 
Tax assessments19 were made against Kenneth in October 
and November of 1981.20 Shortly afterwards, the IRS filed notice 
of federal tax liens21 on the Sliwa Phoenix residence.22 Even 
11. Id. at 608. 
12. Sliwa v. Commissioner, 839 F.2d 602, 603 (9th Cir. 1988). 
13. Id. at 603. 
14. Id. 
15. Id. Kenneth executed and recorded a quitclaim deed conveying his interest in 
the property to Sylvia. Id. 
16. A notice of deficiency (also referred to as a "90 day letter") is a letter mailed to 
the taxpayer by the IRS which is a prerequisite to jurisdiction by the Tax Court. LR.C. § 
6212 (1987). The deficiency is the amount by which the tax determined by the IRS ex-
ceeds the amount calculated by the taxpayer on his or her return. I.R.C. § 6211 (1987). 
17. Sliwa, 839 F.2d at 603. 
18. Id. The Commissioner later conceded that this notice was ineffective as to Syl-
via. [d. 
19. Assessment is the term used when the IRS imposes an additional tax liability. 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 107 (5th ed. 1979). For example, if after an audit the IRS finds 
the taxpayer's gross income understated or deductions overstated, it will assess a defi-
ciency in the amount of the tax that should have been paid. Id. 
20. Sliwa, 839 F.2d at 603. 
21. A tax lien as defined by Internal Revenue Code § 6321 (1987) arises "[ilf any 
person liable for any tax neglects or ,refuses to pay the same after demand, then the 
4
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though the Phoenix home had been conveyed to Sylvia in the 
separation agreement, the Government's position was that Ken-
neth had not effectively conveyed his interest in the house to 
Sylvia until after the tax liens had attached since the notary 
public had failed to sign the verification on Kenneth's 1978 quit-
claim deed.23 
In November of 1983, at the request of the IRS, Sylvia met 
with a revenue agent. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss 
Sylvia's knowledge of Kenneth's illegal income and her claimed 
exemption from liability as an "innocent spouse" under I.R.C. 
section 6013(e).24 Sylvia provided the agent with a sworn state-
ment by Kenneth which stated that at no time had Sylvia been 
aware of his embezzlement activities, and that she had received 
no benefits from the illegal income.211 
amount ... shall be a lien in favor of the United States upon all property and rights of 
property, whether real or personal, belonging to such person." The Code further provides 
that the Government may seize and sell (levy) any property which is subject to a lien. 
I.R.C. § 6331 (1987). 
22. Sliwa, 839 F.2d at 603. 
23. [d. The notary public did not sign the verification on the quitclaim deed, al-
though a notary's seal was placed below Kenneth's signature. [d. at 604 n.1. In Arizona, 
the law requires the signature of a notary public for an acknowledgement to be valid. [d. 
Kenneth and Sylvia corrected this defect by executing a warranty deed recorded on Au-
gust 17, 1981, in which they conveyed the property at the office of the title company. [d. 
The officer of the title company executed a joint tenancy deed, recorded on the same 
day, conveying the property back to Sylvia and Kenneth. [d. On February 19, 1982, Ken-
neth executed a quitclaim deed conveying the house back to Sylvia. [d. 
24. [d. at 604. I.R.C. § 6013(e) (1987) provides in pertinent part: 
(e) Spouse relieved of liability in certain cases.-
(1) In General.- Under regulations prescribed by the sec-
retary, if-
(A) a joint return has been made under this section for a 
taxable year, 
(B) on such return there is a substantial understatement 
of tax attributable to grossly erroneous items of one spouse, 
(C) the other spouse establishes that in signing the return 
he or she did not know, and had no reason to know, that there 
was such substantial understatement, and 
(D) taking into account all the facts and circumstances, it 
is inequitable to hold the other spouse liable for the deficiency 
in tax for such taxable year attributable to such substantial 
understatement, 
then the other spouse shall be relieved of liability for the tax 
(including interest, penalties, and other amounts) for such 
taxable year to the extent such liability is attributable to such 
substantial understatement. 
25. Sliwa, 839 F.2d at 604. 
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One month later Sylvia filed an action against the United 
States in the Arizona district court to quiet title to her resi-
dence.26 The district court ruled that the original 1978 convey-
ance was a completed transfer and quieted title to the residence 
in favor of Sylvia.27 
The Commissioner, in July of 1984, issued Sylvia a second 
notice of deficiency similar to the joint notice in 1981, again 
claiming the deficiencies in Sylvia's income for 1975, 1976, and 
1977.28 In response, Sylvia filed a Tax Court29 petition on Sep-
tember 27, 1984, in which she contended that she was an "inno-
cent spouse" and therefore relieved from liability for the tax 
due.30 
26. [d. 
27. [d. The district court in Arizona awarded attorney's fees to Sylvia pursuant to 
section 7430 in this action. [d. at 604, n.2. 
28. [d. at 604. 
29. CCH, FINDING THE ANSWERS TO FEDERAL TAX QUESTIONS, at 45-46. (1987), pro-
vides the following information concerning the Tax Court 
The Tax Court was established in 1942 as an independent 
agency in the Executive Branch succeeding the Board of Tax 
Appeals created in 1924. The 1969 Tax Reform Act gave the 
Tax Court the status of a Constitutional court, making it part 
of the Legislative Branch of Government .... The Tax Court 
now has the same power as a U.S. District Court to punish 
contempt and to enforce its orders . 
. . . There are nineteen Tax Court Judges, each of whom 
travels around the country to hear cases at a point convenient 
to the taxpayer .... A Tax Court decision may be appealed 
to the federal Court of Appeals for the appropriate circuit. 
The "Golsen Rule" requires the Tax Court to follow a U.S. Court of Appeals deci-
sion within that circuit that is squarely on point. Thus, the when the Tax Court sits in 
the Ninth Circuit it is bound by its precedent where the only appeal from its decision is 
to that court of appeals. Golsen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742, 757 (1970), aff'd on other 
grounds, 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 940 (1971). In other words, 
the Tax Court is bound by the precedent of its reviewing court. [d. 
If a taxpayer's return is audited and the taxpayer and the examining agent cannot 
agree on one or more items, there are opportunities for review at higher levels of the IRS. 
CCH, FINDING THE ANSWERS TO FEDERAL TAX QUESTIONS 51 (1987). The taxpayer will 
receive a "30-day letter allowing him or her 30 days in which to file a request for an 
Appeals Office conference. [d. at 52. If the taxpayer ignores the "30-day letter," he/she 
will receive a deficiency notice called a "90 day letter." The taxpayer then has 90 days to 
in which to file a petition for review with the Tax Court. [d. Alternatively, the taxpayer 
can pay the tax due and sue for a refund in the federal district court where the taxpayer 
resides or in the United States Claims Court. W. KLEIN, B. BITTKER, L. STONE, FEDERAL 
INCOME TAXATION 49 (1987). 
30. Sliwa, 839 F.2d at 604. The filing of a petition with the Tax Court action is the 
demarcation point between administrative conduct and litigation conduct of the IRS. 
Kaufman v. Egger, 758 F.2d I, 3-4 (1st Cir. 1985). See infra note 68. 
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Following IRS procedure, Sylvia met with an Appeals Of-
ficer to try to settle the case.31 The Appeals Officer suggested 
that Sylvia's bank records would be useful to establish her sta-
tus as an "innocent spouse".32 Sylvia's attorney subpoenaed the 
records from the bank. Upon receipt he informed the Appeals 
Officer that the documents were available for his inspection. The 
officer never responded or requested to see the subpoenaed 
documents.33 
In June 1985, as the trial date approached, Sylvia served 
formal discovery requests on the Commissioner.3" The Commis-
sioner responded. asserting that formal requests for discovery 
were premature because the parties had not yet had an opportu-
nity to ex~hange information on an informal basis. The Govern-
ment moved for a protective order.311 
Sylvia moved for summary judgment and shortly thereafter 
the Tax Court took the motions under advisement at a hear-
ing.3s Before the Tax Court could rule, the Commissioner con-
ceded all the issues in the case and stipulated to a dismissal. 37 
One month later Sylvia moved for litigation costs pursuant 
to I.R.C. section 7430.38 The Tax Court decided the motion ex-
amining only the conduct of the IRS after Sylvia had filed her 
petition.39 The Tax Court found that the Commissioner's posi-
31. Sliwa, 839 F.2d at 604. IRS procedure calls for a referral of the taxpayer's file to 
the appeal division for possible settlement after the Commissioner has answered the pe-
tition. (1988) 9 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) 11 67,015. 
32. [d. The bank records were one way in which Sylvia's claim that she had received 
none of Kenneth's illegal income could be independently verified by the IRS. See infra 
note 101. 
33. [d. The court later held that Sylvia had the burden of proof with respect to her 
claim to "innocent spouse" status and should have produced the records independent of 
any request by the IRS. See infra note 100 and accompanying text. 
34. [d. 
35. [d. U.S. TAX CT. R. PRACT. & PROC 70(a)(l) provides: "However, the court ex-
pects the parties to attempt to attain the objectives of discovery through informal con-
sultation or communication before utilizing the discovery procedures provided in these 
Rules." 
A protective order is an order of a court the purpose of which is to protect a person 
from further harassment or discovery. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c). 
36. Sliwa, 839 F.2d at 604. 
37. [d. The IRS stipulated to a dismissal of its notice of deficiency in November of 
1985. 
38. [d. 
39. [d. at 603. 
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tion in litigation had not been unreasonable and denied Sylvia 
attorney's fees.·o Sylvia appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals.·1 
III. BACKGROUND 
A. ApPLICATION OF ATTORNEY'S FEE STATUTES PRIOR TO Sliwa. 
The traditional rule in the United States has been that in 
the absence of legislation providing otherwise, litigants must pay 
their own attorney's fees.· 2 
The first federal statute providing for an award of attor-
ney's fees against the Government in taxpayer litigation was the 
Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976.43 This statute 
was interpreted by the courts to apply only to prevailing defend-
ants and allowed awards only if the Government's position was 
frivolous, vexatious, or in bad faith.·· In addition, the statute 
was held not to apply to cases brought in Tax Court.·11 
40.Id. 
41. Id. See infra note 29. 
42. Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 415 (1978). In Christian-
sburg Garment Co. the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission sued the company 
on a charge of racial discrimination. Id. at 414. The district court granted summary judg-
ment for the company. Id. The company then petitioned for an allowance of attorney's 
fees under § 706(k) of Title VII. Id. at 415. The U.S. Supreme Court held that a prevail-
ing defendant is to be awarded fees in a Title VII proceeding only when the court in the 
exercise of its discretion has found "that the plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasona-
ble, or without foundation." Id. at 421. 
43. Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 
2641 (1976). For a discussion of the history of legislative provisions providing for attor-
neys fees in tax cases see: Knight & Knight, The Awarding of Attorney's Fees: The 
Impact of TRA '86 and Recent Judicial Developments. 66 TAXES 123 (1988). [hereafter 
Knight and Knight.) 
44. In re Kline, 429 F. Supp. 1025, 1027 (1977). (After bankruptcy judge disallowed 
claims by IRS against a bankrupt estate, the trustee moved for attorney's fees against 
the IRS alleging that the Government had known at the outset that its claim was with-
out merit. Id. at 1026. The court held that the IRS had not acted in bad faith, for pur-
poses of harassment, or vexatiously or frivolously in asserting its claims. Id. at 1027.) 
45. Key Buick Co. v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 178 (1977). When the taxpayer filed a 
motion for allowance of attorney's fees, the Tax Court held that the Civil Rights Attor-
ney's Fees Awards Act did not apply to the case. Id. at 184. The court reasoned that the 
statute on its face referred to "any civil action or proceeding, by or on behalf of the 
United States of America" and that in all cases brought in Tax Court the taxpayer was 
the petitioner. Id. at 179. Thus, an action in Tax Court was" 'by or on behalf of the 
taxpayer, not the United States" and not covered by the statute. Id. This was a signifi-
cant limitation since most tax cases are heard before the United States Tax Court. 
Knight & Knight, supra note 43 at 127. Most taxpayers opt for the Tax Court because 
8
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In 1980, Congress expanded the concept of statutory recov-
ery of attorney's fees through the enactment of the Equal Access 
to Justice Act (EAJA).,e This statute authorizes reasonable fees 
and other expenses to a prevailing party other than the United 
States in any civil action brought by or against the United 
States." However, like the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards 
Act, EAJA was not applicable to cases brought in the United 
States Tax Court. U 
The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982'9 
(TEFRA) amended EAJA to codify a new attorney's fees award 
provision in section 7430ljo of the Internal Revenue Code which 
applied to all tax litigation after February 28, 1983.ljl The House 
Report on the billlj2 stated the reasons for the enactment of new 
section 7430: 
they do not have to pay the contested fee until after settlement or judgement. In other 
federal courts the taxpayer must pay the tax and sue for a refund. See generally Mc-
queen, Tax Litigation and Attorney's Fees: Still a Win-Lose Dichotomy, 57 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 471 (1984) (discussing obstacles to prevailing taxpayer's recovery of attorney's fees 
under § 7430). 
46. Equal Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 96-481, 94 Stat. 2327-2330 (1980). 
47. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) (1982). The prevailing party could not recover fees if the 
court found that the position of the Government was "substantially justified". Id. 
48. Adopted as part of Title 28 of the United States Code, the EAJA applies only to 
courts created under Article III such as the Supreme Court, federal courts of appeal and 
the district courts. The Tax Court was established under Article I of the Constitution. 
See McQuiston v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 807, 811 (1982) In Mcquiston, the taxpayers 
were involved in a dispute with the IRS regarding proper allocation of income averaging 
and net operating loss provisions. Id. at 808. After the taxpayers prevailed on these is-
sues the court denied attorneys fees, holding that EAJA doesn't apply to Tax Court since 
it is an Article I court. Id. at 812. 
49. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324, 572 
(1982) (hereafter TEFRA). 
50. See supra note 3. This section authorizes (but does not mandate) an award of 
"reasonable litigation costs" to the "prevailing party" in any civil tax litigation brought 
in federal court. I.R.C. § 7430(a)(2)(amended 1983). In order to qualify as a "prevailing 
party" the taxpayer had to meet two requirements: (1) the taxpayer must first have 
"substantially prevailed" with respect to the amount in controversy; or (2) with respect 
to the most significant legal issues involved." I.R.C. § 7430(c)(2)(A)(ii)(I-II)(amended 
1983)(whether or not the taxpayer has substantially prevailed is up to the court to decide 
or, alternatively, the parties can decide by agreement. I.R.C. § 7430{c)(2)(B)(ii)(amended 
1983). Ordinarily, if the Government concedes the case before trial, the taxpayer by defi-
nition has substantially prevailed; (2) The taxpayer must establish: "that the position of 
the United States in the civil proceeding was unreasonable." I.R.C. § 
7430(c)(2)(A){i)(amended 1983). 
51. TEFRA supra note 49 at 574. 
52. H.R. REP. No. 404, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. 11 (1982). 
9
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The committee believes that taxpayers who 
prevail in civil tax actions should be entitled to 
awards for litigation costs and attorney's fees up 
to $50,000 when the United States has acted un-
reasonably in pursuing the case. Fee awards in 
such tax cases will deter abusive actions or over-
reaching by the Internal Revenue Service and will 
enable individual taxpayers to vindicate their 
rights regardless of their economic circumstances. 
Moreover, the committee is concerned be-
cause the Equal Access to Justice Act, ... does 
not apply to proceedings in the U.S. Tax Court. 
Since most tax litigation occurs in the U.S. Tax 
Court, few taxpayers will be able to obtain 
awards. In addition, the availability of awards in 
only these [district] courts encourages a taxpayer 
to choose the forum in which to pursue litigation 
based on whether awards of litigation costs are 
available. G3 
The joint committee print explaining new section 7430 reit-
erated the House Report's rationale for the enactment of the 
new provision. IH 
Section 7430 was amended by the Tax Reform Act of 
1986:111 The amendments were intended to conform section 7430 
more closely to the Equal Access to Justice Act.1i6 Under original 
section 7430 the taxpayer had to show that the Government's 
position was "unreasonable".1i7 Under the amended statute the 
taxpayer is awarded attorney's fees if he or she proves that the 
Government's position was "not substantially justified".1i8 
53. [d. 
54. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 97TH CONG., 2ND SESS., GENERAL EXPLANA-
TION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE TAX EQUITY AND FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY ACT OF 
1982. (Comm. Print 1982). 
55. TRA '86, supra note 6, § 1551. 
56. See S. REP. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) ("The bill modifies section 7430 
to conform it more closely to the Equal Access to Justice Act.") 
57. I.R.C. § 7430(c)(2)(A)(i) (1987). 
58. I.R.C. § 7430(c)(2)(A)(i), as amended by TRA '86 supra note 6, § 1551(d)(1). 
The legislative history of EAJA which first applied the "substantial justification" in at-
torneys fee cases against the Government stated: "The test of whether or not a Govern-
ment action is substantially justified is essentially one of reasonableness. Where the Gov-
ernment can show that its case had a reasonable basis both in law and fact, no award will 
10
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The Senate Committee Report to the amendments proposed 
but not adopted by the conference committee provided: 
The committee believes that the provision al-
lowing awards of attorney's fees should be contin-
ued but must be modified to provide greater con-
sistency between the laws governing the awards of 
attorney's fees in tax and nontax cases. Specifi-
cally, the committee believes that the Equal Ac-
cess to Justice Act provides the appropriate stan-
dards for awarding attorneys fees. 
. . . Furthermore, the "substantially justi-
fied" standard is applicable to prelitigation ac-
tions or inaction of the Government agents as well 
as the litigation position of the Government.1i9 
be made." H. REP. No. 1418 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1980). The adoption of this stan-
dard "balances the constitutional obligation of the executive branch to see that the laws 
are faithfully executed against the public interest in encouraging parties to vindicate 
their rights." Id. at 10. 
In Rutana v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 1329 (1987), following a Tax Court memoran-
dum decision in their favor, the taxpayers moved for attorneys fees pursuant to section 
7430. Id. at 1330. The court held that the IRS attorney who defended the case for the 
Government should have known from the facts available to him at trial that the Govern-
ment could not clearly and convincingly establish fraud by the taxpayers. Id. at 1334. 
The court looked at the "substantially justified" standard under EAJA in determining 
whether the IRS attorney had been unreasonable. Id. at 1333 Following the Sixth Cir-
cuit's decision in Wyandotte Savings Bank v. NLRB, 682 F.2d 119 (6th Cir. 1982) ("sub-
stantially justified" standard equated with the reasonableness test of section 7430 in a 
dispute regarding an NLRB order) the court applied the considerations expressed in the 
legislative history of EAJA and evaluated the reasonableness of the IRS counsel's con-
duct on the basis of whether he "had a reasonable basis in law and fact for believing that 
he could prove fmud as to petitioner." Id at 1333. (quoting H. REP. No. 1418, supra this 
note). 
In Sher v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 79 (1987), the Tax Court held that the "substan-
tial justification" standard of amended section 7430 is "not a departure from the 'reason-
ableness standard' " of the original statute. Id. at 84. The court stated that there is no 
significant difference between the "reasonableness" standard of the unamended section 
7430 and the new "substantial justification" standard, reasoning that the change in lan-
guage was in accordance with Congress' express intent to conform amended section 7430 
more closely to EAJA. Id. Other amendments to original section 7430 include: (1) The 
$25,000 cap on the award of attorneys fees is eliminated and replaced with a $75 an hour 
cap. LR.C. § 7430(c)(1)(A)(ii)(III)(1987). (2) Costs are denied for any period during 
which a prevailing party unreasonably protracts the proceedings. I.R.C. § 
7430(b)(4)(1987). (3) The definition of "reasonable litigation costs" has been limited by a 
market rate ceiling. LR.C. § 7430(c)(1)(A)(ii)(1987). (4) The amended section does not 
apply to individuals with a net worth of more than $2 million. I.R.C. § 
7 430( c)(2)(A)(iii)( 1987). 
59. S. REP. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986). 
11
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The '86 amendments, while clear on the standard of proof 
required in attorney's fees, cases did not as clearly define the 
exact point at which it applies. Amended section 7430 further 
provided that the Government's position includes its position 
taken during civil proceedings and any administrative action 
(or inaction) by the IRS District Counsel.60 
The House Bill Report to the proposed amendments pro-
vided that the court should have discretion in tax cases 
to assess all or a portion of any award under sec-
tion 7430 against the IRS employee if the court 
determines that the proceeding resulted from any 
arbitrary or capricious act of the employee. It is 
the intention of the committee that this provision 
apply to IRS attorneys as well as non-attorneys. 
Thus, all employees of the Office of Chief Counsel 
of the IRS, such as those in the tax litigation 
function, are subject to this provision.81 (emphasis 
added) 
The final Conference Agreement Report to the amendments 
as finally enacted made no explicit reference to any limitation on 
administrative conduct to be scrutinized in determining the "po-
sition of the United States."62 However, the Conference Agree-
ment did state: 
In addition to providing for attorney's fees with 
respect to litigation expenses, the conference 
agreement also provides that attorney's fees may 
be awarded with respect to the administrative ac-
tion or inaction of the District Counsel of the IRS 
(and all subsequent administrative action or inac-
tion) upon which the proceeding is based.83 
This is the only explanation the Conference Committee 
made to its amendment of the phrase "the position of the 
United States" as finally enacted. The amended statute provides 
in pertinent part: 
60. LR.C. § 7430(c)(4)(B) as added by TRA '86 supra note 6, § 1551(e). 
61. H.R. REP. No. 426, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 840 (1987). 
62. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-802, reprinted in U.S. Code 
Congo & Ad. News 4888-90. 
63. Id. at U-802. 
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(4) POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES.--
The term "position of the United States" in-
cludes--
(A) the position taken by the United States in a 
civil proceeding and 
(B) the administrative action or inaction by the 
District Counsel of the Internal Revenue Service 
(and all subsequent administrative action or inac-
tion) upon which such a proceeding is based.64 
249 
Viewed with the Conference Committee's explanation in 
mind the amendment amplified the scope of the costs recover-
able by the taxpayer to include those costs incurred as a result 
of the action or inaction of the IRS District Counsel. 611 Since 
neither the Senate nor the House proposals were adopted by the 
Conference Committee it is not clear what the legislative intent 
was with respect to the extent of IRS conduct to be evaluated 
under section 7430. 
Prior to this amendment, a frequently litigated issue under 
section 743066 had been whether the court could scrutinize the 
conduct or position taken by the Government before a petition 
or complaint was filed by the taxpayer67 or whether it was lim-
ited to examining only the conduct of the IRS after litigation 
commenced.68 
64. I.R.C. § 7430(c)(4)(A)and(B) as amended by TRA '86 supra note 6, § 1551(e). 
65. But see Shifman v. Commissioner, 53 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. (CCH) 1987-347 at 
1337. In Shifman, The IRS erroneously assessed the taxpayer with tax upon annuity 
income that she had not received. Id. at 1337-1338. The court denied her motion for fees 
taking a narrow view of the Government's conduct in the case. Id. at 1339. The Tax 
Court used the comments of the Conference Committee (quoted above at note 63 in the 
text) to amended section 7430 as support for its position that the "Government's posi-
tion" is to be defined narrowly as that of the Government after litigation commences 
and/or the position taken in any administrative action by the District Counsel. Id. 
66. Barry, Section 7430 and the Award of Litigation Costs: A Reasonable Position, 
39 TAX LAWYER 769, 770 (1986) [hereafter Barry). 
67. This was one of the principal issues decided in Sliwa where the court adopted a 
broad reading of the statute and held that IRS conduct before the taxpayer files a peti-
tion with the Tax Court may be examined for unreasonableness. Sliwa, 839 F.2d 602, 607 
(1988). 
68. Two courts of appeal prior to Sliwa had taken a broad view of the conduct to be 
examined and included in their scrutiny IRS pre-litigation conduct, as well as its posi-
tion during litigation. The Fifth Circuit decided the issue in Powell v. Commissioner, 791 
F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1986). In Powell, the taxpayers were disallowed deductions for losses 
on partnership returns. [d. at 386. After concessions by the Government the taxpayer 
moved for attorneys fees. [d. at 387. The court remanded the case to the Tax Court for a 
13
Thurston: Tax Law
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1989
250 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:237 
The Tax Court subsequent to the 1986 amendment con-
determination of whether the IRS had been unreasonable at the administrative level. Id. 
at 392. The court reasoned that "[i)f the IRS takes an arbitrary position and forces a 
taxpayer to file suit, then, after the papers have been filed, becomes sweet reason, the 
taxpayer should be permitted to recover the cost of suing." [d. The First Circuit ad-
dressed the issue in Kaufman v. Egger, 758 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1985), aff'g 584 F. Supp. 872 
(D. Me. 1984). In Kaufman the IRS sent a notice of deficiency to an address where the 
taxpayers no longer lived. Id. at 2. Three years later the taxpayers received notice that 
the IRS was seizing their refund as partial payment for the earlier deficiency (of which 
they had never received notice). [d. The IRS later acknowledged the defective notice and 
conceded the case. [d. The court allowed attorneys fees holding that it would frustrate 
the purpose of section 7430 "to interpret it in such a way that the IRS, after causing a 
taxpayer all kinds of bureaucratic grief at the administrative level, could escape attor-
ney's fee liability by merely changing its tune after the initiation of the suit by the tax-
payer." [d. at 4. 
Various district courts have held similarly. In Peavy v. United States, 625 F. Supp. 
974 (D. Colo. 1986), an IRS attorney was fined for failing to appear at a settlement con-
ference with the taxpayer. Id. at 976. In addition, the IRS took 14 months to settle the 
case. [d. The court held that the conduct of the Government had not been unreasonable 
even considering that the "position of the United States" refers to position of the IRS in 
its administrative proceedings. Id. In Finny v. Roddy, 617 F. Supp. 997 (E.D. Va. 1985), 
liens were placed on the taxpayer's property to satisfy the tax deficiency of a third per-
son who the IRS believed was the true owner. [d. at 998. The court concluded that" 'po-
sition of the United States' in ... 26 U.S.C. § 7430(c)(2)(A)(i) refers to the position of the 
IRS in its administrative proceedings as well as to the Government's position following 
the filing a complaint in ... court[,] ... " and granted the taxpayer attorneys fees. [d. 
at 1002. In Penner v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1582 (S.D. Fla. 1984), the IRS initiated 
a jeopardy assessment against the taxpayer without ever asking for an explanation of the 
taxpayer's large bank accounts. Id. at 1584. The Court was not persuaded by the Govern-
ment to accept a "narrow reading .... If the Government's position in initiating the 
jeopardy assessment was found to be unreasonable ... it is hard to fathom how the 
Government's position (in defending an unreasonable action) would be reasonable." [d. 
at 1583. The court granted the motion for attorneys fees. [d. at 1584. In Kaufman v. 
Egger, 584 F. Supp. 872 (D. Me. 1984), a notice of deficiency was sent to an address 
where the taxpayers no longer lived. [d. at 874. The court granted the taxpayer's motion 
for fees and held that the" 'position of the United States' that it [the court) shall ex-
amine for the purposes of determining the reasonableness shall be their [the Govern-
ment's] prelitigation conduct which engendered the civil proceeding." [d. at 878. In Hal-
lam, Jr. v. Murphy, 586 F. Supp. 1 (D. Ga. 1983), aff'd, 758 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1985), the 
IRS continued to seek collection of alleged tax deficiencies even though it knew that the 
taxpayers had never received proper notice. [d. at 1. The court granted the taxpayers' 
motion for fees and held that the proper time frame to view the defendant's [Govern-
ment's] conduct is throughout the entire tax proceeding, not just the time frame after 
the plaintiffs filed their lawsuit. Id. at 3. 
On the other hand, some federal courts of appeal have adopted a narrow interpreta-
tion and holding that the court may examine only the reasonableness of the Govern-
ment's position after litigation commences. The Eighth Circuit in Wickert v. Commis-
sioner, 842 F.2d 1005 (8th Cir. 1988), aff'g 51 T.C.M. 1373, held that IRS administrative 
conduct could not be considered in an action for attorneys fees against the Government. 
Id. at 1008. In Wickert, the taxpayer was assessed with a deficiency on the grounds that 
she had received income in the form of alimony from her former husband. Id. at 1006. 
The taxpayer had excluded the income asserting that the payments were not income but 
rather represented a property settlement. [d. After filing a petition with the Tax Court, 
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strued the "position of the United States" as limited to (l)the 
Ms. Wickert met with an appeals officer who conceded the case. [d. The taxpayer sought 
attorneys fees Qn the grounds that the Commissioner had no legal basis in fact to assess 
the deficiency'and that the actions of the IRS had been unreasonable. [d. at 1007. The 
IRS argued that its position had not been unreasonable because after the petition was 
filed it had promptly conceded the case. [d. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the decision of 
the Tax Court which had held that only the IRS' in-court litigation conduct could be 
considered in assessing the unreasonableness of its conduct. [d. at 1008. The court rea-
soned that because the recent 1986 amendments to section 7430 provided that the" 'po-
sition of the United States' includes the government's administrative action or inaction 
as well as its in-court litigating position, Congress has made it clear that the pre-amend-
ment phrase at issue does not include administrative action or inaction." [d. at 1008. In 
Ewing & Thomas, P.A. v. Heye, 803 F.2d 613 (11th Cir. 1986), the taxpayer was forced to 
file a complaint to obtain a release from an IRS lien after he had satisfied the obligation 
secured by the lien. [d. at 614. The government attorneys promptly conceded the case, 
and the court denied the taxpayer's motion for fees. [d. at 616. The court held that the 
"position of the United states" that must be examined is the Government's in-court liti-
gating position [d. at 615. In Baker v. Commissioner, 787 F.2d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1986), 
lJacated, 83 T.C. 822 (1984), the IRS insisted on an assessment against the taxpayer even 
though the taxpayer's similarly situated co-workers had obtained a favorable disposition 
on the same tax issue. [d. at 638. After the Government finally conceded the case the 
court denied the taxpayer fees, taking a narrow view of the conduct of the Government 
and stating that the "relevant position of the United States is the one taken in the cilJil 
proceeding." [d. at 641. In United States v. Balanced Financial Management, 769 F.2d 
1440 (10th Cir. 1985), the taxpayers failed to comply with an IRS summons. [d. at 1442. 
The Government sought an order to show cause why the taxpayers should not be held in 
contempt. [d. The IRS attorney handling the case failed to show up at the hearing. [d. at 
1443. The court held that the conduct of the IRS in the contempt proceeding was not 
unreasonable and reversed the lower courts order granting an award of attorneys fees. [d 
at 1451. The court asserted that the "position of the United States means the arguments 
relied upon by the Government in litigation." [d. at 1450. 
Lower courts holding the same have been: Walsh v. United States, 85-1 U.S. Tax 
Cas. (CCH) 119411 (D. Minn. 1985) where the taxpayer's estranged wife forged his signa-
ture on a joint return. [d. at 88,117. The IRS denied his claim for a refund of his taxes 
and failed to answer his letter asserting that his wife had forged his signature on their 
joint return. [d. The court ruled for the taxpayer on the forged return issue, but denied 
his motion for attorneys fees holding that the" 'position of the United States' is specifi-
cally limited to that taken in civil proceedings brought in a court of the United States." 
[d. at 88,118. In Eidson v. United States, 84-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 11 9182, (N.D. Ala. 
1984) the taxpayers were forced to file suit to obtain a refund of taxes overassessed by 
the IRS. [d. at 83,274. The court refused to allow the taxpayer attorneys fees and held 
that "to consider the Government's administrative position in determining whether to 
award fees and costs to plaintiffs [taxpayers) would be clearly contrary to the specific 
wording of section 7430." [d. In Brazil v. United States, 84-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 11 
9596,(D. Ore. 1984) the IRS assessed taxes against the taxpayers without having first 
sent the statutorily required notice of deficiency. [d. at 84,702. The taxpayers were 
forced to file a complaint in order to enjoin tax levies on their bank accounts. [d. at 
84,703. After the IRS conceded the case, the court allowed no recovery of attorneys fees 
"so long as the United States' position is reasonable from the point in time when litiga-
tion commenced." [d. In Zielinski v. United States, 84-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 119514, (D. Minn. 
1984) the IRS assessed a $500 penalty against the taxpayer for writing on her return that 
she refused to waive her fifth amendment rights. [d. at 84,356. After the taxpayer was 
forced to sue for a refund the IRS conceded the case. [d. The court denied a motion for 
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Government's position after litigation commences and/or (2)the 
position of the District Counsel before litigation commences and 
thus maintained its pre-amendment narrow reading of the 
statute.69 
District Counsel, the IRS's legal staff, often does not be-
come involved in a case until after the taxpayer has filed a peti-
tion with the Tax Court. Thus, under the Tax Court's interpre-
tation of this portion of the amended statute judicial scrutiny is 
limited to the Government's position after the commencement 
of litigation in most cases.70 Consequently, other administrative 
activity that prejudices the taxpayer (such as improper notices 
of deficiency issued by lower echelons of the IRS) in the Tax 
Court's view is not relevant in deciding whether the "position of 
the United States" has been "substantially justified". 
The Second Circuit, the only circuit court to consider this 
issue under revised section 7430 to date has adopted a broad 
reading of the amended statute, as compared to the narrow con-
struction given the statute by the Tax Court71. 
fees stating that "Congress ... did not intend to compensate claimants for unsustain-
able positions in the administrative proceeding." Id. at 84,357. For a comprehensive dis-
cussion of this issue, see Barry, supra note 66. 
69. See, e.g., Sher v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 79 (1987), supra note 58 (pre-petition 
actions of the IRS are not relevant, the court limited reasonableness inquiry to actions 
taken by District Council and Appeals Division); Shifman v. Commissioner, Tax Ct. 
Mem. Dec.(CCH) 1987-347, supra note 65 (appeals officer rather than district counsel 
involved in case, therefore issuance of notice of deficiency did not constitute "position of 
the United States"); Weiss v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 779 (1987) (Tax Court denied tax-
payer's motion for fees asserting that the District Counsel's involvement at the level of 
tax shelter project did not constitute action or inaction by the District Counsel for pur-
poses of section 7430 ); Harris v. Commissioner, 55 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec 907 (CCH) (1988) 
(Court acknowledged that IRS Examination Division's refusal to rescind the deficiency 
notice was unreasonable as the IRS had issued a notice of deficiency after the statute of 
limitations had expired but held that since the Examination division's conduct was prior 
to District Counsel becoming involved in the case section 7430 did not apply. Id. at 909.) 
These decisions are consistent with the Tax Court's earlier view of the statute before 
the 1986 amendments. See Baker v. Commissioner, 787 F.2d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1986), supra 
at note 68. In Baker, When the taxpayer complained about disadvantageous treatment 
he had received in comparison to identically situated taxpayers, no effort was made by 
the IRS officials to determine the merits of his claims. Id. at 643-44. The Court Appeals 
for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's application of section 7430's unreasonable 
standard solely to IRS conduct that occurred "in the civil proceeding." Id. at 641. 
70. See supra note 7. Under the "Golsen rule", supra note 29, a decision in the 
Federal Circuit Court of Appeals binds all subsequent Tax Court decisions in that cir-
cuit. See generally, Devin supra note 9. 
71. Weiss v. Commissioner, 850 F.2d 111 (2d Cir. 1988), reu'g 89 T.C. 779 (1987). In 
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B. THE REASONABLENESS STANDARD PRIOR TO SLIWA. 
The House Report accompanying TEFRA concerning the 
Weiss, the taxpayers purchased an interest in a limited partnership drilling venture. [d. 
at 112. In 1982 the taxpayers claimed their distributive share of the losses sustained by 
the venture on their tax return. [d. In 1986 the IRS sent a statutory notice of deficiency 
to the taxpayers claiming that they had not established their entitlement to the loss 
claimed by them in 1982. [d. The taxpayers filed a petition with the Tax Court alleging 
that the Tax Court lacked jurisdiction because the IRS had not followed the rules re-
quiring an audit at the partnership level before issuing a deficiency notice. [d. at 112-113 
The IRS District Counsel conceded the case to the taxpayers. [d. at 113. 
The taxpayers filed a motion for litigation costs pursuant to section 7430. They al-
leged that the conduct of the IRS in issuing the notice of deficiency was unjustified. [d. 
The IRS contended that the time for determining whether the Commissioners's position 
was substantially justified was subsequent to the filing of the taxpayer's petition in court 
and not at the time of the issuance of the notice of deficiency. [d. at 114. The Tax Court 
held that the 1986 amendments to section 7430 did not reach IRS's prelitigation actions 
or inactions. [d. The Second Circuit rejected the Tax Court's reasoning and held that 
"once the Commissioner takes a position that leaves the taxpayer no alternative other 
than a judicial remedy, regardless of whether the stance is a final administrative position 
or a position in litigation, the IRS has taken a position which constitutes a 'position of 
the United States' within the meaning of section 7430." [d. at 115. The court reasoned 
that since both the 1982 v,llrsion of statute and the 1986 enactment provide that the 
court is to examine the "position of the United States" in the civil proceeding "we be-
lieve that they are not materially different for purposes of determining the circumstances 
that constitute a position of the United States." [d. at 116. Thus, the court aligned itself 
with those circuit courts that had held for a broader reading of the statute citing, among 
others, the Ninth Circuit's holding in Sliwa. 
In addition, the Second Circuit found that the legislative history of section 7430 
indicated that Congress had intended to make the standards for recovery of litigation 
costs in tax cases the same as those applied to other civil actions against the Government 
under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA). [d. Under EAJA the court observed "the 
question of whether the Government's position in a litigated matter is substantially jus-
tified is answered by examining both the Government's in-court litigation conduct and 
any 'action or failure to act taken by the agency upon which the civil action is based.' " 
[d. 
The court found nothing in the legislative history of the amended version of section 
7430 "to suggest that Congress intended to narrow the pre-1986 amendments view of 
section 7430 or to limit strictly an examination of the government's position solely to 
that taken in court." [d. Furthermore, the court noted that the language of the amended 
statute was almost identical to that used in the corresponding section of the EAJA stat-
ute except for the words "District Counsel". [d. The court reasoned that "this further 
suggests to us that agency action that directly results in litigation, such as the Commis-
sioner's issuance of a deficiency notice in this case, should be considered in assessing the 
government's conduct." [d. 
The court concluded by citing Sliwa, where the Ninth Circuit expressed its view 
that the 1986 amendments to section 7430 did not alter the original purpose of the sec-
tion to award attorneys fees where the Government's unreasonable conduct at the ad-
ministrative level compels the taxpayer to litigation. [d. The only district court case to 
date where the revised statute has been read broadly is Bailey v. United States, U.S. Tax 
Cas. (CCH) II 9353 (D.C. Del 1988) The Bailey court said, "It is clear from the statute 
itself that in determining whether the position of the United States was substantially 
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unreasonableness of the Government's position in section 7430 
states that the unreasonableness of the IRS it is to be deter-
mined upon: "the facts and legal precedents relating to the case 
as revealed by the record. "72 Other factors to be considered in 
evaluating the Government's position are: "(l)Whether the gov-
ernment used the costs and expenses of litigation against its po-
sition to extract concessions from the taxpayer that were not 
justified under the circumstances of the case, [and] (2) whether 
the government [sic] pursued the litigation against the taxpayer 
for purposes of harassment or embarrassment, or out of political 
motivation. "78 
The reasonableness standard has been held to encompass 
situations where the Government continues to litigate a case 
which it knows is without merit either on the facts or on the 
law." However, if prior administrative conduct is excluded, the 
likelihood of recovery by a prevailing taxpayer is greatly reduced 
and the limitation on IRS conduct afforded by the statute may 
be meaningless.7lI 
As a result of the Tax Court's restrictive holding in Baker v. 
Commissioner,76 that the "position of the United States" did not 
include any of the IRS' underlying administrative positions, it 
has been difficult for taxpayers to recover attorney's fees in Tax 
Court proceedings under section 7430.77 However, some federal 
justified, the Court must consider not only the position taken in this action but also the 
position the Government adopted in the underlying administrative action." Id. at 83,937. 
72. H.R. REP. No. 404, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. 12 (1982). 
73.Id . 
. 74. See Hallam Jr. v. Murphy, 84-1 U.S. Tax Cas. par. 9320, 83,437 (N.D. Ga. 1983) 
("The continued assertion of a position with knowledge that position is based upon an 
erroneous assumption is per se unreasonable." Id. at 83,437); Kaufman v. Egger, 758 
F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1985), supra note 68 (the IRS seizure of a taxpayer's tax refund and 
attempts to collect on a tax deficiency where it had never effectively notified the tax-
payer of the alleged deficiency "was unreasonable by any standard.") 
But see, eg., Ewing & Thomas, P.A. v. Heye, 803 F.2d 613 (Eleventh Cir. 1986) (no 
recovery of attorneys fees when taxpayer was unable to secure release of a lien through 
IRS administrative processes despite having satisfied the underlying obligation.) 
75. See supra note 68. 
76. 787 F.2d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
77. Former Commissioner of Internal Revenue Roscoe Egger testified before the 
Committee of Ways and Means of the House of Representatives in 1985, Awards of At-
torney's Fees in Tax Cases, 1985: Hearings on I.R.C. section 7430 Before the Subcomm. 
on Select Revenue Measures of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 99th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 13 (1985) (statement of Roscoe Egger, Commissioner of Internal Revenue). The 
committee was convened to consider the advisability of extending section 7430 which 
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district courts and the the United States Claims Court which are 
not bound by the Tax Court have found the Government's in-
court litigation position unreasonable and allowed recovery.78 
IV. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
A. INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 7430(c): "POSITION OF THE 
UNITED STATES". 
The Ninth Circuit first considered Ms. Sliwa's contention 
that section 7430 would be rendered ineffective if the court 
could not consider the IRS' pre-litigation conduct.79 The Gov-
ernment, however, argued that the phrase "in the civil proceed-
ing" limited scrutiny by the court to conduct after the taxpayer 
filed a petition. This issue was critical to Sylvia's case since for 
all practical purposes the only conduct of the IRS after the com-
plaint was filed included a meeting with an Appeals Officer and 
a motion for a protective order. 80 
The Ninth Circuit aligned itself with the First and Fifth 
Circuits.81 Observing that while only litigation costs (costs in-
was due to expire at the end of that year. [d. at 1. Commissioner Egger presented infor-
mation regarding the impact of section 7430 in Tax Court proceedings: in 20 out of 60 
cases (within 26 months) where the issue of attorneys fees had been raised, fees had been 
awarded to a taxpayer. Of these 20 awards, 13 were for amounts less than $5,000. [d. at 
13-14, 18. See Langstraat, Collecting Attorney Fees From the Government in Tax Liti-
gation: An Analysis of the Winners and Prospects for the Future, 17 ST. MARY'S L.J. 
395, 411-413 (1985)(an analysis of Tax Court decisions where taxpayers have attempted 
to claim attorney's fees under section 7430.) 
78. See Sharpe v. United States, 84-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1113,574 (E.D. Va. 1984). 
In Sharp, the Government's litigation position was unreasonable where it ignored the 
express provisions of a trust instrument and asserted that the trust was income to the 
decedent taxpayer's estate. [d. at 84,483. Moreover, the IRS previously had advised the 
Justice Department to concede the case. [d. at 84,484; Columbus Fruit and Vegetable 
Coop. v. United States, 85-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 11 9518 (Cl. Ct. 1985) In Columbus 
Fruit the IRS disallowed deductions claimed by the taxpayer for patronage dividends 
paid to its members. [d. at 89,268. The court awarded attorneys fees holding that the 
litigation position of the Government was unreasonable where it pursued a case in which 
it had seriously mischaracterized the relevant case law and rulings applicable to the tax-
payer's case. [d. at 89,271); Giesecke v. United States, 637 F. Supp. 309, 312 (W.D. Tex. 
1986) In Giesecke, the taxpayer sought successfully to deduct expenses he incurred to 
promote a singer. [d. at 309. The court allowed the taxpayer attorneys fees holding that 
the IRS's litigation position was unreasonable where it "failed to follow clear precedent 
on points that it had acquiesced to more than 25 years ago." [d. at 312. 
79. Sliwa v. Commissioner, 839 F.2d 602, 605 (9th Cir. 1988). 
80. Sliwa, at 604. 
81. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
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curred in and after the filing and preparing of the Tax Court 
petition as opposed to all costs, including pre-litigation attor-
ney's fees) may be recovered under the statute, it did not follow 
that only the Government's litigation conduct could be consid-
ered: "If the conduct of the Government at later administrative 
levels is unreasonable, it stands to reason that the position of 
the Government in defending in the civil proceeding in the first 
place may be unreasonable as well if based upon that con-
duct."B2 The court observed that a narrow reading allows the 
IRS to effectively coerce the taxpayer into settling their case: 
The commissioner therefore has at his disposal a 
powerful tool-and incentive for taxpayer settle-
ment-in keeping the taxpayer out of court for as 
long as possible and then settling the case when 
his bluff is called. If the statute is to have any 
bite at all, courts must be permitted to look at 
earlier conduct to determine whether the initial 
filing of a tax petition was provoked by unreason-
able conduct.88 
The court in support of its position referred to the 1986 
amendmentsB4 which it argued had expanded the conduct that 
the court could scrutinize to determine whether the IRS had 
been unreasonable. Besides conduct in the civil proceeding, the 
1986 amendments added "any administrative action or inaction 
by the District Counsel of the Internal Revenue Service (and all 
subsequent administrative action or inaction) upon which such 
proceeding is based.' "BII The Ninth Circuit stated: "[W]e view 
these amendments as shedding light on Congress' mandate that 
section 7430 provide attorney's fees to a prevailing party in cases 
where litigation is necessitated by the government's unreasona-
ble conduct at the administrative level. "B6 The court reversed 
82. Sliwa, 839 F.2d at 607. 
83. [d. at 607. 
84. [d. at 607 n.6. 
85. [d. 
86. [d. By using the amended definition of the "position of the United States" 
which includes the action (or inaction) of the IRS District Counsel to support its hold-
ing, the Ninth Circuit is reading the amendment broadly. Recent Tax Court cases inter-
preting the amended definition have construed the same language to limit the examina-
tion of the Government's position to actions of the IRS District Counsel exclusive of 
administrative actions of any other divisions of the IRS. (See infra note 115 and accom-
panying text). As the Ninth Circuit examined the conduct of the Commissioner before 
20
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the holding of the Tax Court on this issue.87 
B. THE REASONABLENESS OF THE GOVERNMENT'S POSITION IN 
Sliwa. 
On appeal Sylvia argued that the Government position had 
been unreasonable because: (1) She had put the Commissioner 
on notice of her "innocent spouse" status before he issued the 
second notice of deficiency;88 (2) In the first meeting with the 
IRS examining agent before she filed her petition with the Tax 
Court, the agent had" 'led [her] to believe that she was relieved 
from liability ... under section 6013(e);' "89 and (3) The Com-
missioner's litigating position was unreasonable because it was 
calculated to "obstruct and delay."90 
The court first noted that the summary judgement granted 
to Sylvia by the Arizona State district court quieting title to the 
residence in her favor did not resolve the issue of her "innocent 
spouse" status.91 Second, since she was advised at the conclusion 
of her meeting with the examining agent to produce her bank 
records, the court reasoned that the second deficiency noticed 
was issued: "in part because Appellant had failed at the meeting 
with Hartley [the IRS agent] to substantiate her innocent 
spouse claims. "92 Thus, concluded the court, the Commissioner 
was not unreasonable in later asserting the deficiency in the sec-
ond notice.93 
Ms. Sliwa filed her petition and before the IRS District Counsel (legal staff) was in-
volved, it is not reading the amendment as limiting the administrative conduct to be 
examined merely to the conduct of the IRS District Counsel and thereafter. 
87. Sliwa, 839 F.2d at 607. 
88. Sliwa, 839 F.2d at 608. Sylvia supported her assertion citing Hallam, Jr. v. Mur-
phy, 586 F. Supp. I, (N.D. GA. 1983). In that case the court had held that the IRS's pre-
litigation position was unreasonable where it continued to seek collection of a tax defi-
ciency even though it knew that the taxpayer had never been properly notified. 
89. Sliwa, 839 F.2d at 608. 
90.Id. 
91. Id. The summary judgment resolved only the issue of Kenneth Sliwa's interest 
in the property. Id. at 609. 
92.Id. 
93. Id. In Adams v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 300, 303 (1973) the taxpayer's wife pre-
pared joint returns but did not disclose her separate income to the IRS or her husband. 
Wife made substantial omissions of income on return, the court held that taxpayer was 
not a innocent spouse because he was put on notice of the omissions by his wife's nondis-
closure to him of her income and he failed to prove that he had not significantly bene-
fited from the omitted income. Id. at 302-03. The Sliwa court cited Adams for the pro-
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Finally, the court dealt with Sylvia's argument that the 
Commissioner's failure to respond to her discovery requests and 
his motion for a protective order9• exhibited the Government's 
obstructive tactics. The court dismissed this argument noting 
that discovery procedures should only be used "after the parties 
have made reasonable informal efforts to obtain the needed in-
formation voluntarily."911 Since the informal discovery require-
ment came into play only after litigation commenced with the 
filing of the petition in Tax Court, Sylvia's informal efforts to 
provide records earlier on did not satisfy the rule.96 Thus, the 
court concluded that the Commissioner's motion for a protective 
order was reasonable in light of his concern about the use and 
timing of formal discovery.97 
The court went on to observe that the bank records, which 
contained information that the Government needed in order to 
concede the case, were not in the Commissioner's hands until 
after Sylvia filed her petition.98 Sylvia argued that the Govern-
ment could not have relied on the bank records when it con-
ceded the case because it had refused to subpoena them.99 The 
court rejected this argument noting again that the burden of 
proof is on the taxpayer to prove an entitlement to a benefit 
under the Internal Revenue Code. loo Since Sylvia admitted that 
position that the it was the burden of the taxpayer to prove her innocent spouse status. 
The court rejected Sylvia's arguments that the Commissioner had been put on notice of 
her "innocent spouse" status: "we cannot say that the Government was unreasonable 
... in requiring at least some independent corroboration· of those assertions [that she 
was an innocent spouse] which ultimately came in the form of the bank records." Sliwa, 
839 F.2d at 608. 
94. See supra note 35. 
95. Sliwa, 839 F.2d at 609. The court cited Branerton Corp. v. Commissioner, 61 
T.C. 691, 692 (1974). In Branerton, the taxpayer served interrogatories on the IRS one 
day after the Government attorney had answered the petition. [d. at 691. The court 
granted a protective order to the IRS for a reasonable period of time to allow the parties 
to obtain discovery through informal communication. [d. at 692. 
In addition, the court cited TAX CT. R. 70(a)(l) which provides: "However, the court 
expects the parties to attempt to attain the objectives of discovery through informal 
consultation or communication before utilizing the discovery procedures provided in 
these Rules." 




100. [d. The burden of proof is on the taxpayer for most purposes in Tax Court 
proceedings. A presumption of correctness attaches to the Commissioner's determination 
of a deficiency. See TAX COURT R. 142. 
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the Commissioner examined the bank records for the first time 
at the hearing before the Tax Court on her motion for summary 
judgement, the court inferred that the records had been relied 
upon by the Government in making its subsequent concession. lOI 
The court concluded that the Commissioner was not "un-
reasonable in waiting to concede the case until someone from 
the IRS had a chance to review the records,"102 especially since 
the Commissioner had conceded the case soon after the bank 
records had been examined. 
Thus, although the Ninth Circuit in Sliwa established a 
broad reading of section 7430, the court nevertheless found that 
in this case neither the IRS's pre-litigation conduct nor its liti-
gation conduct was unreasonable. loa 
C. THE DISSENT 
Judge Boochever in dissent asserted that the Government's 
conduct was unreasonable. 10. He reasoned that if the bank 
records were indispensable to the Government's deciding the 
case, the IRS personnel should have requested them "rather 
than forcing the taxpayer to expensive litigation."loll 
In addition, Judge Boochever noted that if after litigation 
was initiated all the evidence weighed towards Sylvia being an 
innocent spouse, then "[t]he burden should have been on the 
government to undergo the expense of producing the records, 
rather than requiring Ms. Sliwa to subpoena them."106 More-
over, the Government had unreasonably delayed examining the 
records even after Sylvia had obtained them "forcing Mrs. Sliwa 
101. Sliwa, 839 F.2d at 609. The court cited Church v. Commissioner, 37 Tax Ct. 
Mem. Dec. 1236, 1240 (CCH)(1978) as support for the relevance of the bank records to a 
determination of innocent spouse status under section 6013(e). In that case the taxpayer 
was assessed with additions to tax based on his failure to report income from the sale of 
stock. [d. at 1238. His wife was found not to be an "innocent spouse." [d. at 1240. The 
court, in reaching its conclusion, relied in part upon the wife's bank records showing 
substantial sums in her account. [d. 
102. Sliwa, 839 F.2d at 609. 
103. [d. 
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to commence discovery in view of the imminent trial setting. "l07 
Thus, in Judge Boochever's view, the Government "unnecessa-
rily precipitated litigation and unreasonably added to the ex-
penses once the suit was filed."108 This result, argued the Judge, 
was contrary to Congress' intent to "partially compensate tax-
payers for expenses and inconvenience caused by unreasonable 
conduct. "109 
V. CRITIQUE 
A. POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES 
The Ninth Circuit's broad reading of section 7430 is in ac-
cord with legislative purpose.110 The narrow reading of other 
courts renders ineffective the impact of section 7430 on abusive 
practices by the IRS.lll The Government can exert great pres-
sure by taking unreasonable positions.lIl1 As soon as the taxpayer 
files a complaint or petition in court the Government can con-
cede the case, thus foreclosing any remedy for the pre-litigation 
abuse suffered by the taxpayer. This result is not only contrary 
to Congress' intent to deter overreaching by the I.R S. but it also 
undermines the other goal addressed by Congress in enacting 
section 7430, which was to decrease the number of cases that get 
litigated in Tax Court by encouraging settlement.ll3 If the Tax-
payer is forced to file a petition or complaint to obtain relief 
from I.R.S. abuse, the goal of early settlement of cases is 
107. [d. It is not clear in the facts whether the Government was put on notice that 
Sylvia had obtained the bank records. This fact could easily have been determined had 
either of the parties initiated informal discovery. 
108. [d. 
109. [d. 
110. The congressional purpose behind awarding attorneys fees was to "deter abu-
sive actions and overreaching by the Internal Revenue Service," and to "enable individ-
ual taxpayers to vindicate their rights regardless of their economic circumstances." H.R. 
REP. No. 404, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. 11 (1982). 
111. See generally Barry, supra note 66. 
112. Because of the requirement that the taxpayer exhaust his/her administrative 
remedies, I.R.C. § 7430(b)(l) (1987), the taxpayer under most circumstances must re-
quest an appeals office conference if the taxpayer disagrees with the proposed deficiency 
determined by the examining agent. Thus, in most cases an unreasonable position 
adopted at the audit level will only be relevant to an award of attorneys fees if the same 
unreasonable position is adopted by the appeals officer thereby compelling the taxpayer 
to file a petition in Tax Court. 
113. See H.R. REP. No. 404, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. 13 (1982). 
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defeated. 114 
There is nothing in the legislative history of amended sec-
tion 7430 to suggest that the reasonableness of the conduct of 
other IRS administrative divisions is to be excluded from review 
by the courts.IUI Instead, the amendment added by the Tax Re-
form Act of 1986 provides: "the term 'position of the United 
St'ates' includes --
administrative action by the District Coun-
sel. ... "{emphasis added)116 is best read as a mandate from 
Congress to the courts to expand their inquiry to a consideration 
of IRS conduct at the administrative level. ll7 
B. THE REASONABLENESS OF THE GOVERNMENT'S POSITION 
In the majority's view, Sylvia's problem was that she failed 
to satisfy her burden of proof as to her innocent spouse status 
before she filed her petition with the Tax Court. If she had done 
so, the conduct of the IRS thereafter would have been unreason-
114. The taxpayer is required by l.R.C. § 7430(b)(I)(1987) to exhaust his/her ad-
ministrative remedies before becoming eligible for an award of attorneys fees. Thus, 
there is no incentive for the taxpayer to circumvent the IRS' administrative dispute reso-
lution procedure. 
115. The Tax Court decisions assume that if Congress had intended to include a 
broader scope of IRS administrative conduct to be examined that it would have specifi-
cally provided for it in the amended statute. See, e.g., Russell v. U.S., 87-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 
(CCH) ~ 9405, 89,119 (1987). In Russell, the IRS assessed taxes against taxpayers with-
out first mailing to them the required notice of deficiency. The court denied their motion 
for attorney's fees after they prevailed in the case, holding that the prelitigation conduct 
was not relevant to a determination of the Government's unreasonableness. [d. at 89119-
20. 
Given the broad scope of the amendments originally proposed but not adopted in 
both the House Bill and Senate Amendments it is plausible to read the amended statute, 
as did the court here in Sliwa, as authorizing a broader inquiry into the reasonableness 
of the Governmental conduct involved in a particular case. See supra notes 85, 86 and 
accompanying text. The language at the beginning of the added subsection supports this 
interpretation: "The term 'position of the United States' includes- . .. (B) any admin-
istrative action ... by the District Counsel .... " (emphasis added) l.R.C. § 7430(c)(4) 
(1987). There is nothing in the language of the statute or the legislative history to indi-
cate that the definition of the term "position of the United States" does not also include 
other unreasonable IRS administrative conduct. Congress could have easily made an ex-
plicit limitation by defining the "position of the United States" to mean only its position 
in the civil proceeding and that of the IRS District Counsel and not other administrative 
divisions of the IRS. 
116. l.R.C. § 7430(c)(4)(B) (1987). 
117. For a good discussion of the policies supporting a broad interpretation of the 
"position of the United States" see Barry, supra note 66, at 782-85. 
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able. This result is fair considering that Sylvia bore the burden 
of proof on this issue. 
The dissent argued that "If bank records were important to 
the Government's decision it should have requested them rather 
than forcing the taxpayer to expensive litigation."118 While it ap-
pears that the Appeals Officer failed to immediately follow 
through after Sylvia's attorney notified him that he had the 
records,119 this bureaucratic blunder does not rise to the level of 
"abusive actions and overreaching by the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice."12o Thus, the majority's conclusion that "we cannot say 
that the Government was unreasonable in requiring better proof 
than Sliwa's mere assertions of innocence. . ."121 is appropriate 
in this case. 
The dissent's position would result in the burden of proof 
shifting to the Government. This view would require the Gov-
ernment to prove that the taxpayer was not entitled to the bene-
fit claimed. Since the taxpayer is the party in the best position 
to produce the proof necessary to establish the claimed benefit 
(the taxpayer is most likely to have the relevant records) it 
makes little sense to place this burden on the Government. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit's holding in Sliwa, that the reasonable-
ness of the IRS' administrative conduct should be considered 
when a court decides whether to allow a prevailing taxpayer at-
torney's fees is commendable. In so holding, the court has re-
mained faithful to the underlying purpose and rationale of sec-
tion 7430 which is to "deter abusive actions and overreaching by 
the IRS and . . . enable individual taxpayers to vindicate their 
rights regardless of their economic circumstances. "l22 
Even after the 1986 amendments to section 7430 the Tax 
Court outside the Ninth Circuit has continued to apply its ear-
lier view that the IRS conduct to be examined for reasonable-
118. Sliwa, 839 F.2d 602, 610 (9th Cir. 1988) (Boochever, J., dissenting). 
119. Id. at 604. 
120. H.R. REP. No. 404, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. 13 (1982). 
121. Sliwa, 839 F.2d at 608. 
122. H.R. REP. No. 404, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. 11 (1982). 
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ness is limited to conduct occurring subsequent to the taxpayer 
filing a petition.123 The Ninth Circuit however, will likely apply 
the broader approach articulated in Sliwa in future cases arising 
under amended section 7430 and scrutinize IRS administrative 
pre-litigation conduct as well as the Government's conduct after 
litigation has commenced.m 
James Thurston* 
123. See supra note 115. 
124. The Tax Court, because of the "Golsen Rule", will be bound to follow the 
Ninth Circuit's resolution of this issue in all decisions it makes within the Ninth Cir-
cuit's appellate jurisdiction. Golsen, 54 T.C. 742, 757 (1970). See supra note 29 for a full 
discussion of the case. 
* Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1989 
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